Federal Reserve : A great crisis, a long debate by Vanessa Sumo
T
he Great Depression is the
enduring symbol of what an
economic catastrophe looks
like: a stock market crash, bank runs,
closed down factories, abandoned
farms, soup and bread lines, and 
families moving from one town to
another in desperate search of work. It
was a tragic event that devastated the
lives of many around the world, and
yet fascinating to those who seek to
fully grasp what went wrong. To this
day, an economic debate rages over
what caused and prolonged the Great
Depression. “To understand the 
Great Depression is the Holy Grail 
of macroeconomics,” wrote Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke in his book
Essays on the Great Depression. 
Before the Depression, brisk eco-
nomic growth had characterized most
of the “Roaring ’20s.” It was a 

















and other public infrastructure were
constructed, which in turn increased
people’s appetite for cars, refrigera-
tors, and other durable goods. 
The introduction of installment 
credit likewise spurred households’ 
consumption. But this period of 
plenty was put to an abrupt halt 
when the stock market crashed in
October 1929. 
Many view Wall Street’s Black
Tuesday as the start of the Great
Depression. In his book, The Great
Crash 1929, economist John Kenneth
Galbraith argued that the bullish
market of the 1920s had created a 
“bubble,” or a situation where stocks
trade at prices much higher than 
can be reasonably explained given a
company’s expected future earnings.
However, there continues to be a
debate about whether the stock market
was indeed overvalued. Economist
Irving Fisher, who wrote The Stock
Market Crash and After a year after 
the crisis, thought that the 
“market went up principally because
of sound, justified expectations of
earnings, and only partly because of
unreasoning and unintelligent mania
for buying.” In the last 20 years, 
post-Depression economists have laid
out their arguments on either side.
Nevertheless, many public officials,
including those at the Fed, probably
believed that a speculative bubble was
driving the stock market boom, and
thus tried to squeeze the flow of
money into the system in order to
prick that bubble. “There should be
no doubt that the United States
adopted a policy of tight money at 
the beginning of 1928, nor should
there be much dispute as to what
motivated this policy,” wrote econo-
mist James Hamilton of the University
of California at San Diego. Hamilton
says that despite repeated assertions
by the Fed that it did not see itself 
as an arbiter of security prices, most 
of those who have studied Fed policy
during this period agree that it 
followed contractionary measures to
curb the stock market boom. 
With the pressure applied and
investor confidence waning, the stock
market crashed. While the crash and
the Depression are two distinct events
in the eyes of economists, the former
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and policy are put
to the test
Soup kitchens were probably the 
only places where the hungry and
unemployed could get a meal during















































RF SUMMER HR2pg2 - 9/21/2007 3:33 PMwas arguably responsible for the sharp
reduction in consumption and invest-
ment that ensued. Household budgets
took a hit, but that loss was probably
not such a large share of their total
wealth. Nonetheless, Black Tuesday
warned of a gloomy economic outlook,
enough to discourage households 
from spending on durable goods and
housing. Firms would hold back or
postpone investments for the same
reason. “It changed the atmosphere
within which businessmen and others
were making their plans, and spread
uncertainty where dazzling hopes of a
new era had prevailed,” wrote econo-
mists Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz in their classic A Monetary
History of the United States.
To make matters worse, a wave of
banking panics gripped the country
just a year later. So severe was the crisis
that by the end of 1933, only about half
the number of banks that existed in
1929 were still standing. The panics
culminated when President Franklin
Roosevelt declared a national “bank
holiday” in March 1933. Roosevelt
ordered all banks to close, allowing
them to reopen only after government
inspectors declared them solvent.
Bernanke says that bank failures
were not uncommon during this time,
largely due to regulatory restrictions on
branch banking that resulted in many
small, independent banks. “In this sort
of environment, a significant number
of failures was to be expected and prob-
ably even desirable,” he wrote. For
instance, rural banks closed when
farmers who borrowed heavily couldn’t
pay their debts following a precipitous
decline in farm commodity prices.
However, the banking crises of this
period differed “both in magnitude
and the degree of danger posed by the
phenomenon of runs.” The absence of
deposit insurance and the fact that
banks had relied heavily on very liquid
deposits which could be withdrawn at
any time resulted in a panic that affect-
ed not just banks that were on the
margin but almost the entire system.
Indeed, starting with the agricultural
areas that experienced the most severe
bank failures, “a contagion of fear
spread among depositors … But such
contagion knows no geographical 
limits,” wrote Friedman and Schwartz.
(There is a debate about how much
actual contagion there actually was.
Some people say that it’s hard to find
evidence of healthy banks taken down
by runs.) 
Why did the stock market crash
and bank failures lead to a long
period of slump that, at its peak,
forced one in four of working
Americans out of a job? Economists
have been trying for decades to fit
long-held views as well as shape new
ones to explain the depth and pro-
tracted decline in economic activity
during the interwar period. Bernanke
thinks that we do not have our hands
on the Grail yet, but substantial strides
have been made in furthering that
quest for answers.
The Liquidationists and Keynes
“Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks,
liquidate the farmers, liquidate real
estate,” said Andrew Mellon, President
Herbert Hoover’s Treasury secretary
during the Depression. “It will purge
the rottenness out of the system. High
costs of living and high living will come
down. People will work harder, live a
more moral life. Values will be adjust-
ed, and enterprising people will pick
up the wrecks from less competent
people,” Mellon said.
This was the prevailing sentiment
among policymakers and economists at
that time — that the Great Depression
was the result of excesses that needed
to be “washed out,” as it were. And the
best way to achieve this was to do noth-
ing; that is, to watch idly as firms and
factories went bankrupt. Perhaps this
was an extreme view, but one which
finds support in two well-established
schools of thought. 
Say’s law, based on the early 19th
century work of Jean Baptiste Say, con-
vinced classical economists that
“supply creates its own demand,” such
that it would only be a matter of time
before wages and prices adjusted to 
let demand mop up that excess 
supply. Moreover, the economists of
the Austrian school argued that the
Depression was the result of an 
overinvestment in capital goods,
fueled by an expansion in credit and
monetary policy that was too loose
during the 1920s. “The inflation 
[of the money supply] was clearly pre-
cipitated deliberately by the Federal
Reserve,” wrote Murray Rothbard, a
prominent economist of the Austrian
school. The abundance of credit, 
and the low interest rate that accom-
panied it, led businessmen to make
investment decisions that perhaps
would not have been made under “nor-
mal” conditions, that is, if the Fed had 
not intervened. 
Eventually, the inflationary bubble
would have to pop, and those invest-
ments would begin to unravel. “The
‘boom,’ then, is actually a period 
of wasteful misinvestment,” wrote
Rothbard. The only way to cure the
Depression would be to let it run its
course. “The Depression, then, far
from being an evil scourge, is the 
necessary and beneficial return of 
the economy to normal after the 
distortions imposed by the boom,”
argued Rothbard. Moreover, trying to
ease the economic malaise with 
more policy intervention would not
only delay the resolution but also 
magnify the pain. For instance, pursu-
ing expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies would only exacerbate this
imbalance and prevent labor and 
capital from being redistributed to
more productive uses.
But as the Depression wore on, this
view of the world became steadily
unpopular, for it did it not seem to 
adequately explain why the economy
was languishing for so long. Was there
really nothing that could be done?
British economist John Maynard
Keynes assured that there could be,
postulating that wages and prices do
not adjust quickly but rather very 
sluggishly, so that the economy 
can fall out of equilibrium for a very
long time. This miserable slump was
not due to an excess in production
capacity, but rather to a shortfall 
in demand. Hence the government can
step in to revive demand and take 
the economy out of the Depression. 
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The series of severe banking panics
from 1930-1933 was a crucial moment
in the Great Depression, for the
impact of bank failures would reach
much further than bank shareholders
and depositors simply losing their
money. It would, as Friedman and
Schwartz painstakingly analyzed, lead
to such a drastic decline in money sup-
ply that they called this phenomenon
the “great contraction.”
The spate of panics and runs that
ensued made people incredibly 
distrustful of banks, as they worried
that banks were no longer safe.
Indeed, people felt more secure hold-
ing on to their money at home,
perhaps even hiding it under a mat-
tress. Also, in anticipation of bank
runs, and probably to convince depos-
itors that they had ample money in the
vault, banks increased their reserves.
People holding on to more currency
and banks keeping more reserves, 
relative to deposits, had the perilous
effect of pulling down the “money
multiplier.” The amount of money
available to keep the economy running
depends on the ability of banks to turn
deposits into loans a multiple number
of times. But if people keep more of
their money at home and banks decide
to increase the amount sitting in 
their vault, instead of putting them 
to work as deposits, then this process
is impeded. The result, as Friedman
and Schwartz find, is that the money 
supply plunged by over a third
between 1929 and 1933.
Could anything have been done to
stem this dangerous decline? Friedman
and Schwartz place the blame squarely
on the shoulders of the Federal
Reserve. “At all times throughout the
1929-1933 contraction, alternative poli-
cies were available to the System by
which it could have kept the stock of
money from failing, and indeed could
have increased it at almost any desired
rate,” Friedman and Schwartz wrote. 
At the height of the wave of bank-
ing panics, the Federal Reserve could
have aggressively loaned money to
banks or suspended the convertibility
of deposits into currency, similar to
the resolution of the 1907-1908 bank-
ing crises. However, the Fed did not
yet exist in that earlier episode, so a
group of private banks took the lead in
lending money and refusing to convert
deposits into currency. (The Treasury
also assisted by making money avail-
able to the troubled banks.) But with
the Federal Reserve System in place,
these banks probably deemed such a
concerted move unnecessary. After all,
it was the Fed’s responsibility to
orchestrate a solution, as would be
expected of a “lender of last resort.”
Thus, the Great Depression was
arguably as bad as it was because of
policy failures at the Fed.
But critics of Friedman and
Schwartz’s view, led by economists
Peter Temin of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Barry
Eichengreen of the University of
California at Berkeley, think that the
fall in money supply was beyond the
Fed’s control. Under the gold standard,
the United States had to keep a con-
stant rate of exchange between the
dollar and gold. As gold flowed out of
the country, the Fed had no choice but
to correspondingly contract the supply
of money in order to maintain the peg. 
Other countries on the gold stan-
dard faced a similar trade-off between
expanding their money supply and
stimulating their economies in times
of hardship, and their commitment to
keeping the value of their currencies
aligned with the rest of world. Indeed,
many studies have shown that the
sooner a country abandoned the gold
standard, the more quickly that coun-
try, including the United States,
recovered from the Depression. (In
1944, a modified form of the gold stan-
dard was agreed upon that would fix a
country’s currency exchange rate to
the dollar. In turn, the dollar would
peg its value to gold. This monetary
arrangement, commonly known as the
Bretton Woods system, ended in 1971.) 
Deflation and Credit Channel
While there is much support for
Friedman and Schwartz’s monetary
view of the Great Depression,
Bernanke argues that the contraction
in money supply cannot fully explain
why the banking crisis would lead to
such a protracted decline in output in
the 1930s. While monetary shocks are
important, he thinks that credit
shocks help explain the link between
the financial sector and the lengthy
duration of the output decline. 
Bernanke finds inspiration in Fisher
who argues that deflation and its
impact on the real value of debt is an
important ingredient in understanding
the great depressions. If debt forces
households and firms into bankrupt-
cies and the health of bank balance
sheets to deteriorate, then banks will
likely move away from providing loans
and put their money in safer assets. At
the same time, many borrowers will
begin looking like riskier bets, because
the value of their assets (or the collat-
eral attached to the loan) relative to
their debt has sharply eroded with
deflation.  Hence, borrowers, particu-
larly smaller ones, will find it very
difficult to obtain bank credit in bad
times. Even if they do find it else-
where, credit will likely be available
only at a substantially higher price
than what they could otherwise have
obtained with banks. Presumably,
banks have the most expertise with
respect to screening and monitoring
borrowers and thus have the lowest
cost of intermediating credit.
Various accounts of the credit 
conditions at the time of the Great
Depression portray the effect of the
banking crisis on the supply of credit.
Bernanke points to one made by 
the National Industrial Conference
Board in 1932: “During 1930, the
shrinkage of commercial loans no more
than reflected business recession.
During 1931 and the first half of 1932
(the period studied), it unquestionably
represented pressure by banks on 
customers for repayment of loans 
and refusal by banks to grant new
loans.” Others observed that groups
that relied heavily on bank loans –
households, farmers, unincorporated
business, and small corporations —
were most affected. Moreover, the
contraction of bank credit in 
the United States was twice as large as
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compared to those with similar 
output declines. 
Bernanke argues that these credit
effects do a good job of explaining the
protracted nature of the decline in
output. His view implies that the way
to get out of the Depression is to
establish new or revive old channels of
credit and rehabilitate insolvent
debtors, which could be a very long
and slow process. A story on why the
economy was slow to recover based on
the importance of monetary shocks
alone, in contrast, depends on the slow
diffusion of information or unex-
plained stickiness of wages and prices.
Indeed, Bernanke says that although
the financial system did not improve
immediately after a government-
directed financial rehabilitation
program was put in place, it could be
argued that this was “the only major 
New Deal program that successfully
promoted economic recovery.”
An Explanation in Equilibrium
Friedman and Schwartz’s money view
and Bernanke’s credit view generally
rely on interruptions to the normal
functioning of the market, such as
sticky wages and prices, or limits to
borrowing. However, there is an alter-
native story to the Great Depression
that does not rely on such frictions. In
this view of the world, markets func-
tion very well, such that the trade-offs
which households and firms face when
making optimal decisions on how
much to save, consume, and work,
determine economic activity, and
change in response to certain shocks.
Typically “real” shocks are held
responsible for the peaks and troughs
of the business cycle. 
How can this “real business 
cycle” approach explain the Great
Depression? Its proponents have
focused their attention mostly on
explaining why the recovery took so
long. As economists Harold Cole and
Lee Ohanian of the University of
California at Los Angeles assert, “The
weak recovery is puzzling because the
large negative shocks that some econ-
omists believed caused the 1929-1933
downturn — including monetary
shocks, productivity shocks, and
banking shocks — become positive
after 1933. These positive shocks
should have fostered a rapid recovery.”
By some measures, the economy 
had not significantly recovered even
by 1939.
Cole and Ohanian suspect that the
Roosevelt’s New Deal cartelization
policies go a long way in explaining the
protracted character of the slump.
Roosevelt believed that the severity of
the Depression was due to excessive
competition that led to lower wages
and prices and consequently to lower
demand and employment. To remedy
this, the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA) permitted collusion in
some sectors, but only if wages 
were raised immediately and collective 
bargaining with labor unions was 
permitted. Even after the courts
struck down the NIRA, the govern-
ment ignored collusive arrangements
for as long as those industries paid 
high wages. The government then
passed the National Labor Relations
Act, which gave more bargaining 
powers to workers than under the
NIRA.
But these measures did not bring
about the outcomes that Roosevelt
had imagined. Instead, these policies
significantly raised wages and prices
and restricted employment, thus 
prolonging the pain of the Depression.
Though others have pointed to the ills
of the New Deal cartelization policies
before, Cole and Ohanian present a
model which finds that the carteliza-
tion policies explain 60 percent of the
slow recovery. 
So why is there no consensus about
the explanation of the Great
Depression more than six decades
since it ended? This may seem surpris-
ing, but it probably reflects the wider
debates among macroeconomists —
which are still very lively —  about the
origins of business cycles. With no
consensus about the “small” fluctua-
tions, it is perhaps no surprise that the
“Holy Grail” of macroeconomics is
still beyond reach. But the Great
Depression has always prompted
economists to think about the origins
of cycles. RF
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